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Introduction
Small weak countries bordering on larger econo-
mically powerful countries find their room for
developmental manoeuvre constrained. They have
markets too small for conventional industrialisa-
tion, often a distorted structure of production and
few or no comparative advantages. While this does
not prevent all autocentric and internally integrated
growth it does provide some real, if not always
obvious, limits to conventional economic and
social transformation.
There is nothing particularly new in this (somewhat
oversimplified) view, but too often the roots and
complexity of these fundamental facts of life fail to
find their way into the development policy-making
process. The process of devising development
strategy and attendant short-term programmes and
plans tends to concentrate on what can be done on
the assumption of existing conditions, however
much lip-service is paid to structural constraints.
The structure of planning in many developing
countries, based as it is on immediate short-term
projects, works with a given environment, and
within the limits of existing opportunities.
There is nothing unusual in this. It is to some extent
in the nature of planning within constraints of
uncertain long-term financial, administrative and
political resources and capacities. But it is worth-
while from time to time to take a longer, and
broader, view of the development process by
bringing to the fore the range of and relationships
between basic, structural limits to long-term
development for such countries. This article is an
attempt to do this for Botswana, a land-locked
small underdeveloped economy overshadowed and
to some extent economically dominated by its
powerful neighbour and regional magnet, the
Republic of South Africa.
Before describing the case of Botswana it is neces-
sary to indicate a framework for considering the
'limits' within which Botswana operates. The
question of 'limits' here is two-fold. One area
concerns the range of limits provided by the
environment within which Botswana exists at the
moment. This in turn resolves into questions about
the position of Botswana with respect to multi-
national capital and Botswana's geopolitical and
economic position in the Southern African peri-
phery. Secondly, one has to evaluate the extent to
which these limits are temporary phenomena or
long-term structural blockages.
In considering these issues two kinds of policy-
making strategies are involved. One is a strategy
designed to manipulate existing factors to overcome
temporary limits in a gradualist sense. The other
strategy aims to transform the structure of the
economy and society to remove deeply rooted
disabilities.
The limits faced, both short- and long-term, impose
themselves at different lev..ds with different effects.
Three levels, with related effects, may be identified.
First, there are in-country or internal factors - the
natural and human resource base, the structure of
production, the distribution of power and the
cumulative tendencies of the existing system of
production and consumption. Second, there is, in
Southern Africa, a regional level. Here the relevant
considerations are the extent and type of regional
domination exercised by the regional centre, South
Africa, its attendant comparative advantages and
the cumulative tendencies of the basis of domina-
tion. Third, on the more general geographic and
economic levels, one has to look at the extent of
hierarchical relations as relations of subordination
(on a regional and country level) and at the
cumulative tendencies of the world system.
This article examines the possibility of Botswana's
autocentric development through a discussion of
the limits to such a process. In doing so it views
'limits' in a very broad historical sense, at different
levels, and concentrates on the long-term obstacles
presented by the regional and world systems. It
suggests that the 'limits' to Botswana's ability to
generate an autocentric process of development
arise from its constitution as a particular kind of
dependent capitalist country, a significant com-
ponent of which has been its geographical position
on the periphery of South Africa - itself a capitalist
formation in a system of such nations. This means
that the roots of the 'limits' to Botswana's room for
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manoeuvre are to be found in its historical consti-
tution and contemporary position.
These need to be highlighted and discussed. The
short-term planning problem and the constraints
implied have been dealt with in earlier work
[Selwyn 1975]. This article begins with a con-
sideration of Botswana's creation in the colonial
period, followed by an examination of its per-
formance in the post-colonial period. It then
evaluates this performance in the context of the
framework outlined above. It concludes with a brief
indication of possible alternative strategies which
focus more clearly on the limits described.
The Labour Reserve Economy: Creation and
Consequence
The early period
The underlying structural impediment to Bots-
wana's development is to be found in its original
constitution as a 'labour reserve' in the colonial
period. The declaration of British 'protection' in
1885-86, the proximate cause of which was a
geopolitical British fear of Afrikaner (Boer) and
German expansionism [Sillery 1974; Dachs 1972],
marked the beginning of a restructuring of
economic and political relationships. This restruc-
turing took internal and external forms.
Internally, territorial demarcation, taxation, and
the restriction of opportunities to engage in
capitalist enterprise created conditions for the
emergence of labour as a commodity, as a wage
earning population [Ettinger 1972; Gunderson
1970; Parson 1979; Parsons 1977; Schapera 1947].
The restructuring of internal political relations,
primarily the superordinate position of British
colonial administration, created and reproduced
this social phenomenon [Sillery 1974; Bermingham
1978; Lord Hailey 1957].
The overall result was the creation of a 'peasanta-
nat' as the leading class. The peasantariat was
characterised by continued subsistence agricultural
production combined with the need to earn wages
to satisfy its cash requirements [Parson 1979].
Socially the colonial state acted to maintain
conditions for subsistence agriculture, for the
reproduction of indigenous control (indirect rule),
and the aggregation and supply of large numbers of
unskilled labourers. The latter phenomenon
required a rudimentary social infrastructure
including a crude transportation system and little
else in the way of educational and economic
structures. Such conditions applied outside Bech-
uanaland in other portions of Southern Africa -
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most relevantly in Lesotho and Swaziland {Leys
1979;Fransman 1978].
Material British interests at the time were in South
Africa's developing mining industry. This required
large numbers of low-wage unskilled labourers
[Legassick and LeClerq 1978]. The low-wage
component of this requirement was met through
the retention of communal subsistence agricultural
activities in the Bechuanaland Protectorate to-
gether with migratory employment. Wages could
then fall below the value of labour power because
the subsistence needs and social infrastructure for
the labourer's family were met in the Protectorate
rather than in South Africa.
Thus, Bechuanaland became a 'labour reserve',
supplying South African mines with large numbers
of labourers and bearing the cost of social repro-
duction for that portion of the South African
working class. By 1910 there were 2,891
'Bechuanaland Natives' employed in the 'Labour
Districts' of South Africa, increasing to 4,323 in
1925. By 1943 nearly half of the men aged 15-44
were working outside Bechuanaland [Schapera
1947].
In these ways Bechuanaland became a dependent
and capitalist economy. Its dependence on South
Africa was nearly complete - reflected in its tax
base, the market for its cattle, and its consumption
of goods depending upon the maintenance of its
position as a supplier of labour. It was capitalist
because of the transformation of the peasantry into
a capitalist working class, the peasantariat,
although with its own distinctive features. And
through this the ability to engage in an autocentric
process of development was lost.
What is seen here are some of the main roots of the
'constraints' on development in present day
Botswana. Colonial boundaries created a large
country with a small population and few known
natural resources. Its function as a reserve army of
labour prevented the building of the social infra-
structure needed even to consider the creation of
productive capacity. It became part of the market
for production in South Africa, not least through its
economic integration in a customs union, its
dependence on a railway owned in Rhodesia, and
the use of South African currency and banking.
Such economic subordination became a condition
for the growth of South Africa. The strength of
South African mining, and subsequently manu-
facturing, were reflected in the weaknesses of
Bechuanaland. Bechuanaland's unattractiveness
for industrial development reflected the attractive-
ness of the infrastructure, central location and other
advantages of the developing capacity of South
Africa.
Industrial capitalism in South Africa was not an
isolated phenomenon; it had its own exogenous
base. It was as a part of British Imperialism that
much of this took place, although the actual point
of production was in South Africa and there was an
element of capital accumulation as South African
accumulation. Thus international capital was
involved in this process. The implications of this
for the contemporary period are enormous. While
the problems of internal development in Botswana
arise most openly in terms of its relationship with
its neighbour, it cannot be assumed that severing or
weakening its ties of dependence on that territory
will enable development to take place. There are, in
addition, its relationships with capital in other
parts of the world to consider.
Dependency and change
These relationships were not static in the sense that
once established they remained unchanged in all
respects. Although the structural base remained,
the colonial period was one of change [Parson
1979]. This in part was brought about through the
external nature of capitalism, but world depression
and war had their effects too. The disintegration of
formal Imperialism in the post-World War II
period created conditions for political ,change in
Bechuanaland. In addition, the colonial social
structure, depending on an indigenous though
subordinate governing class, itself underwent
changes. There was, for example, a need for some
education. And there was a cattle owning class
largely coterminous with the indigenous power
structure. These provided bases for demands for
more indigenous control over the machinery of the
state and a relaxation of restrictions on African
economic activity. And there were changes in
South Africa, notably at the political level with the
victory of the Nationalist Party in 1958 and the
creation of the system of apartheid.
These factors had two distinct and related effects.
They combined to create conditions and an
organisation to bring about an ending of colonial
rule in 1966 and the creation of a politically
independent Botswana. And they created a small
but educated and articulate capitalist class which
led the movement to independence. This organisa-
tion emerged as the Bechuanaland Democratic
Party (BDP) in 1962. It was led by a cadre of cattle
owners with 'traditional' standing along with an
educated stratum of ex-teachers and civil servants.
The importance of this was two-fold. First, the
articulation of peasantariat needs remained inco-
herent. It was a capitalist, not a working class which
led the anti-colonial struggle. This meant that the
fundamental labour reserve nature of the economy
was not challenged. Secondly, the post-colonial
period would see an attempted capitalist trans-
formation: the attempt to develop would be made
within the confines of the pre-existing economic
structure. It is therefore necessary to examine
briefly the attempt at capitalist transformation in
order to assess the persistent blockages to
development in Botswana because of its peripheral
and dependent position.
The Post-colonial Period: Continuity and
Change
The post-colonial period was characterised by two
associated and dominant trends. One was the
achievement of dramatic economic growth. But,
secondly, this growth was achieved through a
diversification of Botswana's dependence. Econo-
mic growth was associated with a re-ordering of the
dependent nature of the economy rather than
through a change in its constitution as a dependent
economy [Johns l973;Parson 1979].
Economic growth and the manipulation of ties of
dependence
The independence era witnessed substantial
economic growth [Republic of Botswana 1977a].
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from
P32.9 mn in 1965 to P192 mn in 1973-74, at
current prices - over 10 per cent per annum in real
terms. All sectors of the economy grew, led by
mining, quarrying and prospecting which grew
from P0.2 mn in 1965 to P15.9 mn in 1973-74.
Formal sector employment grew rapidly, reaching
47,804 in 1972 and 71,380 in 1976, led by
government employment.
Much of this growth reflected three factors. First,
the output of the economy at independence was
low. There were virtually no all-weather roads, no
urbanisation, little formal employment and mini-
mal investments in productive enterprise. A small
increase appeared to be a quantum jump. This does
not detract from the very substantial improvement
in economic performance, but puts it into
perspective.
Secondly, much of this growth was based on the
attraction of significant bi-lateral and multi-lateral
aid support from North America and Europe. To
this extent growth was externally induced. About
three-quarters of all government development
expenditure from 1966-67 to 1980-81 was or was
expected to be financed from external sources
[Republic of Botswana l977a]. Grants and loans on
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this scale were made possible by Botswana's posi-
tion as an extremely poor country, its image as a
worthy aid recipient in its efforts to build a multi-
racial society in contrast to South Africa, its desire
to lessen its dependence on South Africa, its
administrative ability to attract aid, and its capacity
to use it efficiently [Jones 1977].
Thirdly, growth reflected the discovery of mineral
deposits - copper/nickel and, more important,
diamonds. This made the prospect of lending
money to Botswana viable and attracted massive
foreign investment, amounting to several times
GDP. Lacking the finance, manpower and tech-
nology to undertake mineral extraction itself, the
Botswana Government went into partnership with
foreign capital in order to do so. This economic
growth represented an attempt by the Botswana
Government to manipulate its ties of dependency
in its favour. It sought to decrease its dependence
on South Africa by establishing a variety of
economic and other contacts elsewhere. Rather
than accept aid from South Africa, it negotiated
with the World Bank, USAID, the UK, Scanda-
navia and elsewhere for grants and loans. Where
possible it sought to import direct from outside
South Africa. For expatriate manpower the
Botswana Government recruited from outside the
region, largely from the UK for contract civil
servants.
Utilising these new ties, Botswana began the
attempt to loosen the South African and Rhodesian
stranglehold. It was hoped that new employment
opportunities due to mining and manufacturing
would decrease the need for labour migration. A
new customs union agreement, more favourable to
Botswana, was negotiated [Landell-Mills 1971]. In
1976 a central bank and national currency, the
Pula, were created and the currency tied to the US
Dollar rather than the South African Rand. Banks
were required to incorporate locally rather than
remain branches of South African banks. In 1974
the government gave a commitment to creating a
national railway, buying out Rhodesia Railways,
and in 1978 Botswana received its first consign-
ment of rolling stock. The development of a
substantial market for Botswana beef in the UK
lessened dependence on the South African market.
Moreover, the sale of copper/nickel matte and
diamonds on the world market generated funds
outside the Rand area.
Thus, through its strategic geopolitical position in
Southern Africa, its exemplary moral position on
race relations, its commitment to maintaining an
open foreign investment policy, and its ability to
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use the inflow of resources, Botswana both
achieved growth and began constructing a material
position less integrated into South Africa. But this
decreased dependence was far from constituting
independence of South Africa.
The continuities of post-colonial society
This growth did not alter the fundamentally
external base of the Botswana economy; nor did it
mean a more equitable distribution of wealth and
incomes internally. Indeed, the external depend-
ency of the economy increased while wealth and
income distribution improved little, if at all. By
1974-75 46 per cent of GDP (P203.9 mn) was in
the form of exports, 51.5 per cent of which were
virtually raw materials. In the same year imports
of goods and services (P142.3 mn) amounted to
nearly 70 per cent of GDP [Republic of Botswana
l977b}.
More importantly, the growth which occurred was
very largely through foreign investments in specific
extractive enterprises and in infrastructural in-
vestments by the state. Neither of these significantly
affected the employment problem and neither
generated a capacity for a self-sustaining process of
development as an autonomous centre of growth.
The share of manufacturing in GDP actually fell
from 8.2 per cent in 1967-68 to 7.0 per cent in
1974-75. Manufacturing enterprises were small and
tended to be in 'light' and import substituting
branches. Total sales in 1975-76 amounted to
P17.7 mn (of which P6.4 mn were exported);
employment was only 2,564. Imports of inter-
mediate goods amounted to P8.3 mn or 46.9 per
cent of total sales. The value added of P7.3 mn was
less than the value of imported intermediate goods
[Parson 1979]. Much, therefore, of the increased
demand due to greater GDP was met through
increased imports rather than through local
production.
Foreign-owned mines were highly capital intensive.
In 1976 only 5,500 people were employed in the
entire mining and quarrying sector. The mines
employed extremely sophisticated technology
beyond the means of Botswana to control, let alone
develop. There were few backward or forward
linkages.
Many of the problems here were compounded by
the historic nature of a small economy dependent
on manufacturing capacity and technology deve-
loped in South Africa. It thus represented the
perpetuation of the existing vicious circle. Al-
though growth was achieved, it was at the cost of a
deepening involvement in extending ties of
dependence.
State expenditures were largely in infrastructure,
and not in promoting directly productive activity.
The bulk of state expenditures were on roads,
urban development and education. While much of
this was necessary, given the state of these facilities
at independence, such expenditures did not directly
stimulate integrated development, even in agricul-
ture. Agriculture continued to be dominated by
beef production and the export of the products,
particularly to Europe. Here the problem was the
development and maintenance of access to the
European market.
Internally, a governing class developed consisting
mainly of salaried state employees and a stratum of
well-to-do cattle owners who, through their control
of the state, received very heavy subsidies and other
government aids. The majority of the population,
the peasantariat, derived few benefits and little if
any increased ability to engage in production. In
1974-75, 45 per cent of the rural population owned
no cattle at all; they thus participated in beef
production solely as labourers and their ability to
plough using oxen was severely constrained
[Republic of Botswana 1 975a}. Productive oppor-
tunities for the majority remained as limited as they
had been in the past. This created well-known
problems in its wake, with the associated potential
for social instability [Parson 1979; Lipton 1978].
Thus, there were significant structural continuities
from the colonial into the post-colonial period.
While the benefits derived from Botswana's inter-
national position improved considerably, the
structural base from which these emanated changed
not at all. The limits imposed on the direction and
growth of the economy were geographically
widened but their nature did not change.
In the post-colonial period, then, Botswana pur-
sued a strategy of negotiation and autonomous
action to reduce its direct dependence on South
Africa. Through negotiation it achieved certain
concessions in the customs union, negotiated firm
quotas for beef sales and maintained its political
identity. Independently it has sought and received
capital grants, loans and expatriate manpower from
sources other than South Africa. It created a mone-
tary system and central bank, and committed itself
to taking over the railway. Much of this was made
possible because it had important mineral deposits
which generated internal resources. This gave a
material base to its negotiating position. Botswana
achieved budgetary self-sufficiency in 1972 and has
generated government revenue in excess of its
recurrent requirements since then [Hermans 1974].
In addition to mining investments as a means of
building a more solid production base, Botswana
sought to generate an autonomous agricultural
economy. Here the main thrust, as yet still gaining
momentum, was the attempted capitalist trans-
formation of the cattle industry [Parson 1979;
Chambers and Feldman 1973; Republic of
Botswana 1973, 1975b]. The old system of
communal unfenced grazing land combined with
private ownership of cattle and higher beef prices
led to overstocking and the possibility of irrever-
sible damage to the natural environment. The BDP
governments' response was to enclose the land on
the basis of individual and group leases. These
could be used as security for loans and would be
inheritable. Along with the creation of facilities for
those dispossessed (and who would be available as a
wage-labour force on the ranches) this would
amount to the transformation of communal into
private lease-hold land.
At the same time, to make the operation economi-
cally viable, expanded profitable markets were
sought. This meant in particular the maintenance
and, it was hoped, the expansion of Botswana's
richest market, the European Economic Com-
munity. But this depended upon the EEC agreeing
to rebate the import levy on Botswana beef, for if
Botswana were subject to the duty the market
would become only marginally profitable. So far
the Community has been willing to grant such
rebates only on an annual basis.
Relying on its negotiating skill and loan resources
from the World Bank, among others, Botswana has
begun to allocate areas for commercial ranches.
This venture in capitalist transformation is one that
did not depend directly upon Botswana's relations
with South Africa. But while Botswana overcame
an element of its dependence on South Africa, its
strategy was one of engaging in a directly dependent
relationship with the main centres of capitalism.
Thus Botswana's dependence was not so much
decreased as diversified.
The Post-colonial Period: Capitalist Strate-
gies of Development in the Labour Reserve
Political Economy
The key long-term assumption underlying develop-
ment planning in Botswana has been that a small,
dependent capitalist country, located in a region
dominated by a larger capitalist country, can
become an autonomous centre of growth through
the creation and generalised spread of capitalist
relations of production, and that this can be done
through an association with the centres of world
capitalism. Botswana's attempt to achieve an
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autonomous position has assumed in other words,
that regional domination by South Africa is more
or less unrelated to the domination of capital on a
world-scale. Domination and its resulting obstacles
are seen as regional problems.
Thus monopoly relations of production in mining,
to the extent that these are not a specifically South
African phenomenon, are not seen as creating new
links of dependence, domination or deformation of
the structure of production. They are seen as a
means of increasing Botswana's ability to make
internal decisions about the structure of produc-
tion. Further, the expenditure of large sums of
money, obtained externally, on a social infrastruc-
ture designed to stimulate capital intensive
development is viewed as creating independence
from South Africa. And the creation of a specifi-
cally large-scale capitalist cattle industry, with its
market in Europe, is seen as the means of creating
autonomy in relation to South Africa.
An evaluation of the post-colonial period based on
this major assumption has a self-fulfilling quality. If
these are the criteria, then it can be shown that a
degree of autonomous growth has occurred.
Although Botswana continued to depend on South
Africa for much of its imports, and for transporta-
tion, it decreased its dependence in termi of
monetary policy, revenue, manpower, and markets.
Although the cumulative tendencies of domination
have not been entirely broken, a stage of 'takeof1
may be reached, where Botswana develops a struc-
ture of production in which autonomous growth is
generated outside its integration in a regional
system. Although Botswana will have to 'live with'
a limited market and natural resource endowment,
the possibility of long-term autonomy is implied in
the present trajectory.
If, however, one takes a wider and more compre-
hensive view, serious questions arise as to the
structural position of the Botswana economy in
Southern Africa and in the world. Two problems
arise. First, has a plateau been reached (or will one
be reached) in decreasing Botswana's dependence
on South Africa? If Botswana remains a national
entity, its limited market and natural resources will
remain as more or less permanent restraints on
industralisation in comparison with South Africa.
It is highly unlikely, given the present configuration
of production relations in the region, that Botswana
will be able to develop manufacturing c'pacity.
Moreover, the development which has taken place
has not fundamentally affected the reproduction of
a peasantariat dependent upon migrant labour. The
creation of internal production opportunities has
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not stemmed the flow of labour abroad. Political
stability and incomes in Botswana still depend
upon this outlet. And the evidence appears to be for
a declining demand for Botswana labour in South
Africa [Lipton 19781, which will weaken Bots-
wana's bargaining position in the South African
labour market.
Secondly, what interpretation should be placed on
Botswana's new relation to the centres of capitalism
outside the region? Botswana's new 'autonomy' has
meant creating an infrastructure, and social struc-
ture, facilitating the introduction of monopoly
relations of production in mining and a capitalist
transformation of cattle production. Roads, water
supplies, electricity generation and other services
were provided disproportionately for the construc-
tion of mining operations, and yield very marginal
benefits otherwise. Moreover, mechanisms have
been created to control wages, trade unions, and
elements that might lead to 'instability' from the
point of view of multinational capital. Botswana's
'autonomy' has been exercised to provide such
services and conditions. Its integration into a world
system is heightened by the fact that the trans-
formation of cattle production is ultimately
premised on maintaining Botswana's market in
Europe; the development of capitalist relations in
cattle production depends upon this.
Thus, underlying historical tendencies and the
structural deformation of the economy as a labour
reserve have changed little if at all. This is not to
say that there has been no growth. The size of the
surplus produced in Botswana has increased
dramatically and a stratum of society has benefited
from this. Botswana has improved its position in
carving out a place in the world outside its
relationship with South Africa. But the historically
induced domination of Botswana by capital has
been reproduced in all essential respects.
Conclusion : Alternative Strategies
Our evaluation cannot be left at this point. The
inevitable, and legitimate, question poses itself -
what is the alternative? Just what can be done?
Those who recognise the structural problems often
fall back on such questions as a justification for
pursuing the existing strategy.
This paper presents no detailed master blueprint.
But that is not an admission of the impossibility of
its construction. Until, however, there is a general
sense that the end of the line has been reached, little
concerted effort will be brought to bear on the
question. Moreover, no detailed blueprint can be
drawn up; this will emerge in the day-to-day
struggle to achieve goals which can be specified at a
general level. Nevertheless a start can be made, if
only to suggest that there is an alternative.
First, there must be a change in the perception of
what is being developed, and in whose interest.
Social needs must be redefined in terms of the class
which now has the greatest need and the least
ability to produce, namely, the peasantariat.
Development planning must start with their prob-
lems, and principally the absence of productive
opportunities. And first and foremost there is the
lack of such opportunities in agriculture, not as
wage labour, but as part of a system which maxi-
mises the involvement of the peasantariat in agri-
cultural production. Here an increased degree of
self-sufficiency through peasantariat production
would be a leading objective.
This would require a variety of planning reorienta-
tions. It would require a shift of resources away
from capital intensive cattle production and toward
smaller-scale more labour intensive crop produc-
tion. This would involve a reorientation of research
and project planning in water supplies toward
smaller-scale irrigation. It would also require
research into new crop varieties. Much could be
learned by research on existing 'traditional' food
crops, their suitability for developing hybrid
varieties and improved methods of cultivation. A
shift would be required away from the production
of cattle for meat, and toward their use as produc-
tive assets in the form of draught power in arable
production. This, in turn, would yield an impetus
for a substantial effort in developing new or 'alter-
native' technologies, building on existing peasant-
ariat technology.
New rural peasantariat-based educational, admin-
istrative and political structures would be needed,
fully integrated both with the rural areas and the
new planning apparatus. And a general decentrali-
sation of responsibility for project planning and
implementation would be required. Some form of
block grants to rural communities with back-up
support in logistics and financing could allow the
peasantariat to control the direction of planning.
This would significantly affect policies and
strategies regarding mineral extraction. The need
for revenue from the mines would be set against the
consequences of that extraction for the peasant-
ariat. The questions of whether to mine, how
rapidly to mine, and the extent of structuring social
relations in order to mine could be looked at
through peasantariat eyes.
This is one alternative. It is not a magic solution for
serious problems have to be tackled. The struc-
turing of the power of the peasantariat, the
relationship of technical expertise to peasantariat
planning, and the position of the bureaucracy, are
three problem areas. Moreover, such an alternative
is unlikely to be adopted given the existing distri-
bution of class power in Botswana. Indeed, some of
these suggestions are contained in existing
documents; without exception the 'equity' recom-
mendations have not found their way into planning
[Lipton 1978; Chambers and Feldman 1973]. The
peasantariat does not control the state and there is
little likelihood that it will in the near future. The
existing power holders - the large cattle owners and
the bureaucrats - are unlikely to abandon their
position.
However, given the present course, these issues will
have to be faced at some point. It is, therefore, time
to begin thinking seriously about them. This is not
least the case given the possibility of significant
change in South Africa. In this dicussion the con-
fining and long-term 'limits' to development can be
faced most squarely.
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